INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS ON SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL: TYPOLOGY AND MECHANISMS OF REALIZATION
https://doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2019-3-202-214
Abstract
In conditions of global competition intensification and use of power tools to pursue economic policy it becomes necessary to substantiate possible strategies of inter-entity interaction on supranational level. Based on the hypothesis of uneven distribution of violence potential among economic entities the author described a model of power re-distribution, which shows in deliberate manipulation of rules and/or mechanisms of compulsion to their observance. The article develops the author’s concept of institutional interventions. They are considered as strategies of inter-entity interaction in global economy. Institutional intervention is a behavior model based on compulsion through fixing (changing) rules. The author identifies methodological foundations, prerequisites and theoretical frames of investigating institutional interventions as a form of involuntary exchange. The author was the first to describe the situation of forced balance characterized by the fact that further use of power potential can cause a drop in legitimacy and growth in control costs for invader, while resistance of the intervention object to established institutional order can cause a rise in disobedience costs. Apart from that the article grounded a thesis that for the forced balance it is not typical to distribute the gain of interaction like with voluntary exchange, it is typical to come to an agreement concerning the level of victim’s tolerance (maximum costs, which the victim is ready to endure) and a threshold (minimum possible) value of invader legitimacy. As landmarks for assessing the deviations from balance levels of stability and legitimacy of institutional design were proposed. A generalized mechanism for institutional intervention realization was developed.
About the Author
Sergey А. Kristinevich
Belarusian State Economic University
Belarus
Belarus
Sergey А. Kristinevich PhD, Assistant Professor, Assistant Professor of the Department for Economic Theory of the Belarusian State Economic University.
26-1 Partizanski Avenue, Minsk, 220070
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Review
For citations:
Kristinevich S.А. INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS ON SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL: TYPOLOGY AND MECHANISMS OF REALIZATION. Vestnik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. 2019;(3):202-214. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2019-3-202-214
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