TO SAVE HUME OR WAS THERE ANY CONTRADICTION IN ONE OF HIS CENTRAL ARGUMENTS
https://doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2017-1-163-170
Abstract
The article deals with the analysis of S. Botros’s book, which found a contradiction in the motivation argument by D. Hume. The author proves that S. Botros’s conclusions were unconvincing and at the same time tries to find the source of ideas given in her book. He supposes that they were caused by the wrong interpretation of one of the central notions by D. Hume, i. e. the idea of belief. An attempt was made to protect the irrational interpretation of this notion. It was shown that Hume’s belief in its pure form has pre-reflexive essence prior to rationality. This pre-reflexive belief but not intellect gives rise to morale, according to D. Hume and this belief could free us from extreme skepticism.
About the Author
Oleg A. Zelenskiy
Plekhanov Russian University of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
PhD, Senior Lecturer of the Department for History and Philosophy of the PRUE
36 Stremyanny Lane, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
References
1. Zelenskiy O. A. Motivatsionnyy argument Hume: trudnosti interpretatsii [Hume’s Motivation Argument: Difficulties of Interpretation]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 7: Filosofiya [Bulletin of the Moscow University. Series 7: Philosophy], 2016, No. 2, pp. 102–110. (In Russ.).
2. Zelenskiy O. A. D. Hume o protivorechii mezhdu razumom i affektami [D. Hume about Contradiction between Intellect and Fits of Passion]. Aktual'nye voprosy obshchestvennykh nauk: sotsiologiya, politologiya, filosofiya, istoriya, sbornik statey po materialam LIX–LX Mezhdunarodnykh nauchno-prakticheskikh konferentsiy [Acute Problems of Public Sciences: Sociology, Politology, Philosophy, History, collection of articles on materials of LIX–LX International Conferences]. Novosibirsk, SibAK, 2016, pp. 111–117. (In Russ.).
3. Kant I. Prolegomeny ko vsyakoy budushchey metafizike, kotoraya mozhet poyavit'sya kak nauka [Prolegomena to Future Metaphysics, which Can Arise as Science]. Kant I. Sobranie sochineniy [Collection of works], in 8 vol., Vol. 4. Moscow, 1994. (In Russ.).
4. Hume D. Issledovanie o chelovecheskom poznanii [Research on Human Cognition]. Hume D. Works, in 2 vol., Vol. 1. Moscow, 1996. (In Russ.).
5. Hume D. Traktat o chelovecheskoy prirode [Treatise on Human Nature]. Hume D. Works, in 2 vol., Vol. 1. Moscow, 1996. (In Russ.).
6. Botros S. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction. London, New York, 2006.
7. Cohon R. Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.
8. Harrison J. Hume’s Moral Epistemology. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976.
9. Hume D. A Treatise on Human Nature. Floating Press, 2009.
10. Mackie J. L. Hume’s Moral Theory. London : Routledge, 1980.
11. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 8th edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
12. Vaccari A. Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction (review). Hume Studies, 2007, Vol. 33, No. 1.
Review
For citations:
Zelenskiy O.A. TO SAVE HUME OR WAS THERE ANY CONTRADICTION IN ONE OF HIS CENTRAL ARGUMENTS. Vestnik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. 2017;(1):163-170. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2017-1-163-170
Views:
295
Email this article 